The lack of security measures in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their persistent online connectivity give adversaries an opportunity to target them or abuse them as intermediary targets for volumetric attacks such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) campaigns.
INTRODUCTION
With the number of seamlessly connected and online IoT devices soaring into 10's of billions [10] , potential adversaries set such devices on target via malicious codes. Such codes or malware not only infect the devices themselves but constantly communicate with their Command and Control (C2)/dropzones around the world for future actions and updates. Forming a network, these devices have the potential to launch attacks on other targets resulting in Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks [9] .
Reckoning that the malware sources, the C2 servers, the intermediary targets, and the victim must be connected to the Internet for the attacks to happen, studying these endpoints is important. This work attempts to understand such endpoints to decipher such patterns. Towards our goal, we extract endpoints from IoT malware binaries and perform a data-driven analysis to understand geographical affinities and their exposure to risk.
Our work is important given its insight into understanding the Indicators of Compromise (IoC), and the behavioral aspects necessary Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s 
DATASET CREATION
Our primary dataset contains a total of 2,423 IoT malware samples collected from IoTPOT [11] . We design a tool that can reverseengineer each of the malware samples and extract the specific IP addresses from the malware code base. In total, we extract a total of 106,428 target IP addresses, resulting in 2,211 unique target IP addresses associated with 973 malware samples. We also find a total of 2,407 IP addresses, resulting in 877 unique dropzone (source of attack)/C2 IP addresses corresponding to 2,318 malware samples. Additionally, to better understand the dynamics of the extracted IP addresses, we augment the IP addresses with other details including their: country, Autonomous System Number (ASN), and location, using online DNS and IP lookup tools like the UltraTools [6]. Furthermore, we utilize the internet scanning services, e.g. Shodan [5] , to procure the vulnerable endpoints.
IP CENTRIC ANALYSIS 3.1 Dropzone-Target Inter-relationship
We examine the affinity between the dropzone and the target IP addresses and find that ≈77% of the unique target IPs receive less than 10 attacks, while at the other end of the spectrum we see that one unique target IP received 72 attacks. We also find a dropzone IP associated with one malware targeting 1,265 target IP addresses, which is significantly larger than the average (121). Shared targets between dropzones. To inspect the shared targets between dropzone IP addresses, we group the target IP addresses by the dropzone IP addresses, and capture the common targets among the dropzones. Evidently, the results of the above analysis reflect that a large proportion of targets are being shared among dropzones. There were 2,199 cases (12.11%) with 100% overlap between dropzones. Overall, we found 6,451 cases (35.53%), with more than 80% overlap. If the target IP addresses between different dropzones are identical, it is possible that the attacker obtained the same targets through similar vulnerability analysis (e.g. Shodan) or shared the target list from underground communities. 
Geographical analysis
In this section, we focus on the distribution of the distances between the dropzones and their target IPs. To visualize the flow of attacks in a holistic sense, we plot circular areas whose sizes are proportional to the number of targets placed according to their average position (not the exact position) on a world map with geodesic lines originating from various dropzone locations. Figure 1 shows the country-level perspective of the relationship. The locations of the dropzones (depicted in orange) are spread around various countries, but, the results show a large concentration of target areas focused in Central Asia. The distribution of dropzone and target IPs by country is shown in Table 1 . We notice a large distribution of dropzones from US pointing to targets in Asian countries such as Vietnam. Additionally, China and Brazil are target of attacks originating from European countries. Imperva Incapsula states that Vietnam (12.8%), Brazil (11.8%) and China (8.8%) were the countries with the most-infected devices (from the Mirai botnet) [7] .
Network Penetration Analysis
This section focuses on analyzing attributes gathered from Shodan and Censys [3] , namely, active ports, vulnerabilities. Active Ports. For each dropzone and target IP address, we use information gathered from Shodan and Censys the list of active ports. We extract 5,745 active ports from 716 of 877 dropzone IPs and 1,114 active ports from 129 of 189 non-masked target IPs. Each port number is typically associated with a service, such as port 80 for HTTP traffic. While we observe common services like SSH (port 22), HTTP (port 80), and HTTPS (port 443), we point out to the usage of Network Time Protocol (NTP) on port 123. NTP is UDP-based and can be prone to "IP spoofing" for DDoS attacks [8] . This attack is also emphasized in [1] , since the attacker can amplify attack packet size 1,000 larger by exploiting NTP.
Vulnerabilities. We then examine the susceptibility of the IP addresses; in particular, we determine the vulnerabilities present in the IP addresses. We gather the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier [2] . In our analysis, the second-most common CVE among the dropzones: CVE-2014-1692. The NVD [4] reports the severity of this vulnerability as "high" since it might allow remote attackers to cause a Denial-of-Service attack through memory corruption due to uninitialized data structures from the hash_buffer function in OpenSSH. Considering that open ports lead to increased security risks, we look for ports that are necessary for a device to operate uninterrupted. Taking a conservative approach, we suggest that if a port is being used by less than 10% of devices in a given device type, it should be closed to reduce its exposure to risk. Our results show the susceptibility of high-wattage IoT devices, such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, power distribution units, etc., can be abused by the attackers to launch large-scale coordinated attacks. Additionally, the high presence of such susceptible devices lays the foundation for attacks as demonstrated by Soltan et al. [12] .
NETWORK CENTRIC ANALYSIS

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyze the ≈78.2% of total responsive public IPv4 endpoints among dropzones and their targets as extracted from IoT malware and spread across the globe from diverse perspectives. Additionally, we augment our analysis results by leveraging the use of IoT search engines like Shodan or Censys.
